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ABSTRACT 
 
Evaluating Importance Ratings as an Alternative to Mental Models  
in Predicting Driving Crashes and Moving Violations. (May 2011) 
Jennifer Nicole McDonald, B.S., North Dakota State University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Winfred Arthur, Jr. 
 
 The present study investigated the extent to which importance ratings (i.e., a 
measure of perceived importance for driving-related concepts) are a viable alternative to 
traditional mental model assessment methods in predicting driving performance. 
Although mental models may predict driving–related outcomes—crash involvement and 
moving violations—common mental model assessment techniques are associated with 
administrative limitations and challenges, which can affect how valid mental models are 
as assessments of knowledge structure. Importance ratings, as a measure of driving-
related knowledge that may be associated with fewer administrative limitations, were 
hypothesized to provide equal predictive validity for driving–related performance 
outcomes in a sample of undergraduate students. 
To investigate the extent to which the measurement of mental models and 
importance ratings contribute to the prediction of driving crashes and moving violations, 
students completed Pathfinder, a common computer-based mental model assessment 
method, and paper-and-pencil importance ratings. In addition, students completed a test 
of driving knowledge and reported driving behaviors and outcomes including at-fault 
 iv 
crashes and moving violations that occurred over the past five years (i.e., from 2005 to 
2009).  
A group of expert drivers completed mental model and importance ratings 
assessments as well. Data across expert raters were combined and analyzed for 
appropriateness to serve as referent scores for each assessment. Students’ mental model 
accuracy as well as importance rating accuracy was based on the extent to which student 
mental models and ratings agreed with those provided by the group of expert drivers. 
The results suggest that importance rating and mental model accuracy predicted 
crash involvement and moving violations. Whereas mental model accuracy was a 
stronger predictor of the number of moving violations, importance rating accuracy 
predicted the number of at-fault crashes slightly better than mental models. Although 
inconclusive, these results suggest that importance ratings may be a viable alternative to 
traditional mental model assessment in predicting some driving outcomes. Future 
research is warranted on importance ratings and other alternative mental model 
assessments. 
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Knowledge organization has been of interest to industrial and organizational 
(I/O) psychologists as evidenced by numerous journal articles (e.g., Day, Arthur, & 
Gettman, 2001; Edwards, Day, Arthur, & Bell, 2006; Mohammed & Dumville, 2001; 
Schuelke et al., 2009).  Researchers argue that knowledge involves not only knowledge 
of facts and concepts, but also a structural component that reflects how information is 
organized (Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993).  Specifically, researchers propose that 
knowledge is multifaceted, and can be conceptualized as consisting of declarative 
knowledge, procedural knowledge, knowledge organization, and cognitive strategies and 
skills (e.g., meta-cognition) (Kraiger et al., 1993).  Early in skill acquisition, trainees 
focus on declarative knowledge, but as training (or experience) progresses, they focus 
more on procedural knowledge. As procedural knowledge increases, trainees start to 
develop meaningful structures for organizing knowledge. This has led several 
researchers to focus on the organization of knowledge rather than the amount or type of 
knowledge (e.g., Kraiger et al., 1993; Rouse & Morris, 1986).  However, assessments of 
knowledge organization are associated with long administration times and limitations 
regarding the extent to which concepts can be sampled from complex task domains.  As 
such, the primary objective of the present study is to investigate the extent to which 
importance ratings can serve as substitutes for mental models (a common 
operationalization of knowledge organization) in predicting driving outcomes. 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Applied Psychology. 
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Mental Models 
 Mental models are structures that contain organized knowledge in meaningful 
patterns, which are stored in memory (Johnson–Laird, 1983; Rouse & Morris, 1986).  
Mental models contain information regarding concepts, features, and the relationships 
between them (Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973).  Similar concepts and terms include 
associative nets, cognitive structures, conceptual frameworks, mental maps, knowledge 
structures, and schemas (Dorsey, Campbell, Foster, & Miles, 1999; Johnson–Laird, 
1983; Kraiger et al., 1993; Rouse & Morris, 1986).  Although there may be subtle 
differences between these terms, the term mental model will be used for the purpose of 
the present work. 
 Concomitant with the varying terminology for mental models (Rouse & Morris, 
1986), a variety of techniques have been used to operationalize mental models, including 
network scaling, multidimensional scaling, interactively elicited cause mapping, and 
text–based cause mapping (Cooke, Salas, Cannon–Bowers, & Stout, 2000; Mohammed, 
Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000).  However, network scaling—using Pathfinder—is possibly 
the most widely used technique in academic journals (Schuelke et al., 2009).  Pathfinder 
provides a number of indices that characterize mental models, such as accuracy and 
coherence.  Accuracy represents the degree to which a specified mental model 
adequately represents a given knowledge or skill domain.  Coherence is a metric of 
internal consistency and reflects a knowledge structure’s overall degree of organization. 
 Empirical evidence suggests that mental models have important implications for 
individual performance (Day et al., 2001; Dorsey et al., 1999; Schuelke et al., 2009).  
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Many researchers have articulated the informational value of using mental models as an 
explanatory mechanism (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Cannon–Bowers & Salas, 2001).  
Specifically, mental models allow individuals to predict and explain events and form 
expectations based on the recognition of relationships.  Furthermore, well developed 
mental models allow individuals to vicariously experience events (Johnson–Laird, 1983) 
and mentally manipulate model parameters to anticipate expected outcomes in novel 
situations.  Mental models can also serve as a diagnostic aide in that mental models can 
help teams and individuals evaluate their knowledge and analyze effective and 
ineffective performance (Jagacinski & Miller, 1978; Sanderson, 1989). 
 Measuring knowledge is of much value to the I/O field as a whole and to training 
in particular. Knowledge assessment using mental models allows for the identification of 
content and structure useful for predicting performance (Cooke et al., 2003). In turn, the 
insights made available through mental model assessments provide significant resources 
for the design of training content. 
 As previously mentioned, assessments of knowledge structures are associated 
with limitations and challenges.  For instance, Pathfinder requires participants to make 
pair–wise comparisons between concepts.  As such, the number of concepts relates to the 
number of pair–wise comparisons by the function k(k–1)/2, where k equals the number 
of concepts.  For example, Day et al. (2001) investigated the relationship between 
mental models and task performance using 14 terms which required participants to 
generate 91 pair–wise comparisons.  Eliciting pair–wise comparisons presents two 
challenges to researchers.  First, the administration time required to complete the 
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assessment is a function of the number of concepts.  Day et al. allowed 20 minutes for 
participants to complete the Pathfinder assessment with 14 terms.  Thus, an extrapolation 
suggests that if an additional five terms were used (i.e., 19 terms), the administration 
time would double to 40 minutes.   
Second, due to administrative constraints, researchers tend to limit the number of 
terms used in mental model assessments. Goldsmith, Johnson, and Acton (1991) noted 
that the quality of a mental model depends greatly on how many concepts are chosen to 
represent the domain. Based on their comparisons of structures using 30 concepts and 
randomly selected subsets of 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 concepts each, they concluded that 
mental model predictive validity is a linear function of the number of concepts (i.e., 
higher predictive validities were found for subsets with more concepts). See Figure 1 for 
a graph of their findings. 
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Figure 1.  Predictive validity based on number of Pathfinder concepts. The figure shows 
the linear function between the number of concepts in Pathfinder assessments and the 
average predictive validity of the resulting mental model networks (Goldsmith et al., 
1991). 
 
Goldsmith et al. (1991) investigated the possibility that certain relationships 
between concepts result in higher validity than others by testing subsets of concepts  
(e.g., one subset of 15 concepts was found to have a mean predictive validity of .78 as 
compared to .74 for all 30 concepts). The subsets examined were found to predict 
performance at or below the average of all the concepts. Thus, the authors concluded 
that mental model predictive validity depends on the number of concepts and stabilizes 
across samples—in this case, students—when an adequate number of concepts are 
included. This is informative to the present study because it provides some evidence that 
a greater number of concepts likely leads to an increase in predictive validity beyond any 
specific subset of concepts. Although the authors did not explicitly define the exact 
number of concepts for optimal validity, the data provide compelling support that more 
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concepts will result in greater predictive validity of mental models. However, greater 
domain representation in the form of more concepts can also be quite a hindrance to the 
process of eliciting mental models. 
Goldsmith and Kraiger (1996) reported that the typical number of concepts used 
in their research was around 20 to 30—representing only a subset of concepts deemed 
important by subject matter experts (SMEs). Additionally, in a brief review of five 
studies (Day et al., 2001; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; 
Lim & Klein, 2006; Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002; Rentsch & Klimoski, 
2001), the mean number of terms used in Pathfinder analyses was 12.20 (SD = 3.03, min 
= 8, max = 15). Although concepts are entirely domain-dependent, adequate 
representation is clearly impacted by this significant practical constraint. 
 The limitation surrounding domain representation is particularly problematic for 
complex tasks—a domain that is often of interest to mental model researchers.  For 
example, driving may consist of as many as 92 tasks (McKnight & Adams, 1971), which 
would result in as many as 4,186 pair–wise comparisons (assuming all tasks were used). 
Thus, researchers must make a choice between a representative list of terms or limiting 
the number of terms and decreasing representativeness.  From a job analysis perspective, 
one may use higher–order task statements (or major work behaviors) to capture the 
entire job domain.  However, the number of tasks and concepts may exceed the 
administrative limitations when sufficient detail is needed, as is the case with mental 
model assessment. 
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 Clariana and Wallace (2009) compared three types of mental model assessments 
based on the predictive validity and efficiency in administration of each. They found that 
on average, the pair-wise elicitation method required the most time to complete (447.4s) 
compared to list-wise (193.3s) and clustering (115.5s) approaches. In a follow-up study, 
Singh (2007) specifically evaluated the extent to which participants expressed fatigue, 
enjoyment, and decreased focus as a function of the number of concepts in the pair-wise 
and clustering methods. Two conditions for each method were designed to assess these 
effects. Specifically, participants were assigned to complete one of the Pathfinder 
assessments, which included either a high (k = 21) or low (k = 8) number of concepts.  
Following the Pathfinder assessment, participants completed reaction measures to assess 
levels of fatigue, attention, and enjoyment experienced during the task. 
 Results showed strong relationships between mental model coherence and fatigue 
(r = .65, p < .01) and between coherence and enjoyment (r = .58, p < .01), illustrating 
that the quality of a mental model is affected by respondent reactions to the assessments. 
She also found that participants in the conditions with fewer concepts reported 
significantly less fatigue, F (2, 36) = 25.37, p < .01, η2 = .44. Additionally, participants 
who completed the pair-wise measure with fewer concepts reported having more 
attention, t (16) = 1.91, p < .05, d = 0.90. Taken together, these results highlight the 
impact of an onerous mental model assessment method—namely that participants do not 
enjoy making large numbers of pair-wise comparisons, and their resulting reactions to 
such measures may impact the usefulness of the mental models derived. 
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Importance Ratings 
 Given the administrative limitations and constraints associated with the use of 
mental model assessment methods that use pair–wise comparisons, a common 
methodology in structural knowledge measures (e.g., Cannon-Bowers et al., 1999; Day 
et al., 2001; Edwards et al., 2006; Marks et al., 2002), researchers are interested in 
identifying alternative measurement methods that do not engender said limitations and 
constraints (DeChurch & Mesmer–Magnus, 2010; Mohammed, Ferzandi, & Hamilton, 
2010).   
Mohammed et al. (2010) provide an informative review of knowledge structure 
measurement strategies.  In their review, they highlight the need for alternative methods 
of assessment, as well as studies that simultaneously assess multiple methods of 
assessment.  For instance, Cooke and colleagues (Cooke, Kiekel, & Helm, 2001; Cooke 
et al., 2003) reported that Pathfinder ratings were more strongly correlated with 
performance on an uninhabited air vehicle simulation compared to questionnaires that 
did not capture model structure. The researchers noted that the elaborate nature of 
knowledge content and structure translates into differing uses across knowledge 
measures—an important consideration in the comparison of mental model assessments. 
Other efforts towards identifying less burdensome mental model assessments are 
represented in the investigation by Webber, Chen, Payne, Marsh and Zaccaro (2000). 
The authors used a ratings approach based on an established performance appraisal 
technique of critical incidents to capture strategic team mental models. This study 
9 
 
 
provides valuable evidence that mental models generated from ratings can be used to 
predict performance, a finding that the present study aims to replicate. 
DeChurch and Mesmer–Magnus’s (2010) meta–analysis confirms the finding 
that knowledge generated from ratings can predict performance and further suggests that 
the mental model measurement strategy moderates the observed relationships between 
shared mental models and outcomes.  Specifically, their results suggest that model 
structure is particularly important for predicting team processes but not performance.  
Mental model measurement strategies that capture model structure—pair–wise 
comparison and card sorting (or concept mapping)—did not meaningfully differ in terms 
of relationships to performance (ρ = .31 for both strategies) compared to methods that 
did not capture model structure (ρ = .32).  As such, the additional limitations and 
constraints associated with assessments aimed at capturing model structure may be 
avoided if predicting performance is the primary focus of the research effort. 
 A similar alternative measurement strategy is importance ratings.  Importance 
ratings are posited to reflect an individual’s understanding and perceptions of the task 
domain.  As such, individual differences in perceptions should predict performance such 
that individuals with a more accurate perception of task demands should perform better 
than those with less accurate perceptions.  Theoretically, this proposition is supported 
based on the well-established link between knowledge and performance (Hunter, 1986). 
The degree to which individuals are accurate on their knowledge of each concept’s 
importance should allow for differentiation in performance outcomes. Furthermore, 
importance ratings may reflect how participants prioritize information and subtasks thus 
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reflecting an individual difference in motivation to perform specified tasks, guide 
decisions, and direct attention and behavior.   
Importance ratings of task statements and knowledge, skills, abilities, and other 
characteristics are widely used in I/O psychology and have a longstanding history of 
being used to analyze and inform researchers about job and task content (Brannick, 
Levine, & Morgeson, 2007). For example, hybrid job and task analysis methods—such 
as the combination job analysis method—rely on importance ratings to provide task 
importance values that represent the difficulty and criticality of each task. Importance 
ratings are also used to evaluate the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities for job 
selection purposes. Thus, importance ratings provide knowledge used to guide decisions 
and procedures for researchers and practitioners alike. Although importance ratings are 
largely a perceptual measure, researchers have found empirical evidence that perceptions 
of relative importance can shed considerable light on meta-cognitions surrounding 
decision making (Goldstein, 1990; Goldstein & Mitzel, 1992). 
Several studies have evaluated the extent to which importance ratings converge 
with traditional mental model assessment methods. One study—Schvaneveldt, Beringer, 
and Lamonica (2001) —found support for using importance ratings to predict 
differences between novice and more experienced pilots. Specifically, Schvaneveldt et 
al. investigated differences between importance ratings and mental models assessed 
using pair–wise comparisons for both groups of pilots.  In evaluating the expert and 
novice results, significant differences were found such that of the 16 concepts, 11 were 
rated more important by expert pilots compared to novice pilots.  In a follow–up study, 
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34 pilots provided Pathfinder ratings; the results suggested that expert and novice pilots 
had similar mental models.  However, because the previous study used a relatively small 
sample and did not investigate importance ratings and mental models relationships with 
performance, an objective of the present study is to replicate these findings.   
Resick, Murase, Bedwell, Sanz, Jimenez, and DeChurch (2010) directly 
compared Pathfinder, priority rankings, and importance ratings in a team decision-
making task. The results showed that Pathfinder’s predictive validity was superior to 
either of the other assessment methods. While this study highlights the ongoing research 
attempts to identify and validate alternative mental model metrics, the present study 
contributes to further exploration of importance ratings as a viable alternative by 
expanding the research question to individual-level performance on driving—a complex 
task.  
Importance ratings assess the content of the task domain, but unlike mental 
models, importance ratings do not capture mental model structure.  Although importance 
ratings do not provide relational information between terms, they do provide relational 
information between the terms and the overall task.  Specifically, the importance rating 
stem in the current study instructed participants to rate the importance of each concept 
"as it relates to driving safely." Thus, the importance rated by participants provides 
insight to their knowledge of concepts relevant to the overall task of safe driving. 
However, the present study does not intend to confirm or deny whether importance 
ratings capture structural knowledge. For comparative purposes, it is speculated that 
importance ratings fall more closely to the declarative end of a continuum of knowledge 
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measures while traditional pair-wise mental model assessments fall closer to the 
procedural end of the same continuum. 
Although the comparison of importance ratings and mental models in predicting 
performance is not new, the present study provides an important contribution to this 
distinction as it applies to predicting individual knowledge and performance on a 
complex task. To this end, the present study assessed the comparative effectiveness of 
importance ratings and mental models in predicting driving outcomes. 
Driving Performance 
 Vehicular crashes are the most common cause of death on the job representing 
39% of all fatal work injuries (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2010).  As such, driving is of interest to I/O psychologists (e.g., Elliott, Armitage, & 
Baughan, 2003; Legree, Heffner, Psotka, Martin, & Medsker, 2003; Newman, Griffin, & 
Manson, 2008).  Researchers in this domain distinguish between information processing 
errors and violations of safe driving practices as anomalous behaviors (Arthur & Day, 
2009; Arthur, Barrett, & Alexander, 1991; Parker, Reason, Manstead, & Stadling, 1995; 
Reason, 1990) and posit that they have differential effects on critical driving outcomes 
(e.g., moving violations, vehicle crashes).  Specifically, errors result from failures in 
information processing, whereas violations result from motivation, values, and attitudes.  
As such, Arthur and Day (2009) posit that different clusters of individual differences 
will predict different aspects of driving behavior.   
 State regulations typically require driver license applicants to pass a knowledge 
test in order to receive a driver’s license.  Furthermore, efforts to prevent vehicle crashes 
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and unsafe driving practices typically focus on driver education.  These policies reflect a 
belief that driving knowledge is associated with driving performance.  However, 
although driving knowledge has received considerable research attention (e.g., Arthur & 
Doverspike, 2001; Legree et al., 2003; Struckman–Johnson, Lund, Williams, & Osborne, 
1989), the empirical support for the knowledge–performance relationship in the context 
of driving is equivocal (Arthur & Doverspike, 2001; Struckman–Johnson et al., 1989).  
One potential explanation for the weak observed correlation between written driving 
knowledge test scores and crash involvement is that crash involvement is influenced by 
attitudinal variables as much as it is by ability variables (Arthur & Day, 2009).  This has 
led researchers to investigate a myriad of other individual differences, including 
demographic, exposure, information–processing, and personality variables (Arthur et al., 
1991; Elander, West, & French, 1993; Hansen, 1989).  However, another plausible 
explanation for the lack of relationship between driving knowledge and crash 
involvement is that declarative knowledge focuses on the amount of knowledge, whereas 
knowledge organization may be more predictive of crash involvement. This position is 
supported by theory put forth by Ackerman (1988) in which he describes a learning 
acquisition model to explain the development of skill acquisition over time. Specifically, 
this empirically supported model informs that declarative knowledge is predictive of 
performance primarily in the early stages of skill development. In the domain of driving 
performance, declarative knowledge may be useful for predicting performance to the 
extent that knowledge is needed to master the required laws and rules of the road. 
Beyond this threshold of the learning curve, it is likely that declarative knowledge no 
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longer provides utility in predicting driving performance outcomes. Thus, the primary 
research question of the present study is to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of 
importance ratings and mental models in predicting driving performance. Specifically, 
the present study sought to investigate whether importance ratings predict driving 
outcomes as well as a mental model measurement that utilizes relatedness ratings.  
 
15 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Participants consisted of 118 undergraduate students from a large southwestern 
university drawn from the undergraduate psychology research subject pool.  The mean 
age of the participants was 18.65 years (SD = 0.77) and 59 (51.3%) of them were female.  
On average participants had been driving for 2.99 years (SD = 1.14, min = 1.00, max = 
6.00). 
Materials and Procedure 
General Mental Ability (GMA).  Participants first completed the Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices (short form), which consists of two practice items and 
12 test items.  This measure of GMA has a reported test–retest reliability of .76 and has 
an administration time of 15 minutes (Arthur, Tubre, Paul, & Sanchez–Ku, 1999).   
 Driving Behavior Questionnaire.  The Driving Behavior Questionnaire (Arthur 
& Doverspike, 1992) is a self–report measure of driving behavior (see Appendix A).  
Participants reported the number of at–fault crashes and moving violations they received 
in the past five years (i.e., since 2005).  Participants also provided information regarding 
their driving experience including the number of years they have been driving. 
 Driving Knowledge.  The Driving Knowledge Test was an 18–item, multiple 
choice exam.  It was the road rules section of a retired operational Texas state driving 
exam (Texas Department of Public Safety, 1984).  Each question consisted of a stem 
followed by four alternatives, only one of which was the correct answer.  All items were 
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based on the state driving manual.  The total score was the number of items answered 
correctly. 
Pathfinder.  Pathfinder (Schvaneveldt, 1990), a structural-assessment-technique-
based program, was used for the elicitation, analysis, and comparison of driving mental 
models.  The 12 driving-related concepts included in the measure were developed 
through a content analysis of the Texas state driving manual.  Next, these concepts were 
reviewed and revised by one I/O psychology faculty member and two senior I/O Ph.D. 
candidates.   
Participants were asked to make judgments about the relatedness of all possible 
pairs of concepts.  In the administration of Pathfinder, trainees first read the instructions 
and then made similarity (i.e., relatedness) ratings on all possible pairs of the 12 driving 
concepts resulting in a total of 66 ratings. For each pair of concepts, participants were 
asked to indicate the extent to which they were related by using a graphic of 4 concentric 
circles (i.e., a bull’s–eye; see Figure 2).  Each circle represented a different level of 
relatedness consisting of synonym, extremely related, largely related, and moderately 
related.  Concepts could also be placed outside the concentric circles in which case the 
concepts were considered less related or unrelated (see Figure 2).  
Mental model networks were derived with Pathfinder algorithm parameters set to 
r = ∞ and q = number of concepts less one.  To test for the accuracy of participants’ 
mental models, the degree of similarity between the participants’ mental models and 
expert referent mental model was assessed.  The expert referent model is discussed in 
detail later.  Specifically, accuracy was assessed by computing closeness (C; Goldsmith 
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& Davenport, 1990). C is roughly equal to the ratio of the number of links shared 
between two models divided by the total number of links. The values of C can range 
from 0 to 1, with 1 representing perfect similarity.  Coherence was also assessed, which 
reflects the extent to which there is a meaningful pattern in how concepts are arranged 
(Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1996).  Specifically, coherence scores are correlations between 
direct relatedness ratings and derived indirect ratings (Interlink, 1992; Stout, Salas, & 
Kraiger, 1997). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Pathfinder screen. This figure illustrates the mental model assessment 
measure used to capture relationships between concepts related to safe driving. 
Participants clicked and dragged concepts related to the central focal concept to the 
appropriate level of relatedness. Unrelated concepts were left along the left side, outside 
of the circles. 
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Importance Ratings.  Following the Pathfinder ratings, participants immediately 
completed the importance rating form, which consisted of the same 12 driving–related 
concepts that were included in the Pathfinder mental model measure described above. 
(See Appendix C for the complete importance rating measure.)  The Pathfinder and 
importance rating measures were not counter-balanced—all participants first completed 
the Pathfinder assessment and then provided ratings on the importance of each concept. 
The limitations and threats associated with this procedure are note in the Discussion and 
Conclusions section. 
 Participants rated each concept on a 5–point scale, with 5 representing extremely 
important concepts and 1 representing unimportant ones.  Accuracy was assessed based 
on the degree of similarity between participant importance ratings and expert importance 
ratings (described in detail below) by computing the absolute difference between 
participant and expert ratings.  For ease of interpretation, the importance rating accuracy 
was reverse coded. Specifically, deviation scores for each concept were represented by 
the absolute value of the difference between the referent true score and each participant's 
rating. This value was then subtracted from 4 so that the final accuracy index could be 
interpreted as higher scores reflecting greater accuracy on a scale from 0 to 4. For 
example, a participant rating of 4 as compared to a referent score of 5 (i.e., a total 
deviation of 1) would produce an accuracy index of 3 for that concept. The total 
accuracy index is a sum of the reverse-coded deviation scores across all concepts for 
each participant. 
19 
 
 
 Referent Scores.  To assess the accuracy of both importance ratings and mental 
models, five male police officers were recruited to serve as SMEs.  All SMEs were 
active police officers with considerable experience ranging from 4 to 25 years (M = 
18.40 years, SD = 8.35), and extensive training.  Specifically, all SMEs were currently 
serving as crash reconstruction officers with the local city police department.  As such, 
they received extensive training in defensive driving, crash investigation, crash 
reconstruction, and traffic enforcement.  SMEs provided importance ratings and mental 
model ratings using the same procedures described previously.   
 Table 1 presents the individually collected importance ratings and mental model 
indices of coherence and number of model links for each SME. SME 1 was discovered 
to have an unacceptable coherence score demonstrating a lack of discernible structure 
within his mental model. As a result, averaged importance ratings and mental model 
scores were computed for all SME subgroups excluding SME 1. Table 2 presents the 
interrater agreement analyses and combined mental model indices for these SME 
subgroups.  
A comparison of the resultant importance ratings and mental models suggests 
only two SMEs provided ratings that displayed acceptable psychometric properties 
across both measures (SME23).  Subsequently, the two mental models were averaged 
within the Pathfinder program to yield one referent structure, which had a C of .52, and a 
coherence of .34.  Importance ratings from these two experts were averaged, and the two 
sets of ratings displayed high levels of inter-rater reliability (.90). 
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Table 1 
SME Importance Ratings and Mental Model Indices 
Concept SME1 SME2 SME3 SME4 SME5 
Braking 5 5 5 5 3 
Changing lanes 5 4 4 5 2 
Fog 5 4 5 5 3 
Headlights 3 3 3 4 3 
Highway 4 2 3 5 3 
Judging distance 5 5 5 5 4 
Situational awareness 5 5 5 5 5 
Passing 4 4 4 4 3 
Rain 4 4 4 5 3 
Right of way 4 5 4 4 3 
Speed 5 4 4 5 4 
Turn signal 4 4 4 5 3 
 
MM coherence -.02 0.26 0.28 0.53 0.27 
Number of links  42 34 26 36 23 
Note. SME = subject matter expert. MM = mental model. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Importance Rating Interrater Agreement and Mental  
Model Indices for SME Subgroups 
SME IR α MM  
Coherence 
Number of 
links 
SME23 0.90 0.34 19 
SME24 0.57 0.46 24 
SME25 0.54 0.40 19 
SME34 0.59 0.51 19 
SME35 0.59 0.33 15 
SME45 0.63 0.41 15 
SME234 0.70 0.16 26 
SME235 0.78 0.37 25 
SME245 0.55 0.01 26 
SME345 0.61 0.01 25 
SME2345 0.71 0.34 19 
Note. SME = subject matter expert. IR = importance  
ratings. MM = mental model. Alphas are standardized.  
SME combinations calculated for only those with  
coherent mental models (SME 1 did not meet the  
coherence threshold of .20).  
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RESULTS 
 
Frequencies for both driving performance criteria are shown in Table 3. A larger 
percentage of participants reported moving violations (28%) as compared to at-fault 
crashes (22%).  Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the 
study variables.  Regarding the driving performance outcomes, moving violations and at-
fault crashes were significantly positively correlated (r = .33, p < .01). 
 
Table 3 
Frequencies of Reported Driving Performance Outcomes 
 At-Fault Crashes Moving Violations 
 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 92 0.78 85 0.72 
1 16 0.14 18 0.15 
More than 1 10 0.08 15 0.13 
 
 
 
Importance ratings were positively correlated with both the number of years 
driving (r = .21, p < .05) and cognitive ability (r = .18, p < .05). Driving knowledge was 
correlated with mental models (r = .20, p < .05), such that higher scores on the driving 
test were associated with greater mental model accuracy. Correlations between the 
predictors of interest and the criteria were in the directions proposed such that greater 
mental model and importance ratings accuracy are both associated with fewer adverse 
driving outcomes; however, these were not statistically significant.  
 To determine the incremental predictive validity of the importance ratings and 
mental model accuracy measures, demographics (i.e., age and sex), cognitive ability, 
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declarative knowledge, and number of years driving (these will be considered commonly 
used predictors for simplicity in reporting), were entered in the first block of the 
hierarchical regression. Then importance ratings or mental model indices were entered in 
the second block, followed by the remaining predictor (either mental models or 
importance ratings) in the third block.  
Table 5 presents the results from hierarchical regression analysis of the accuracy 
indices on driving performance. The measure of variance accounted for, R2 and R2, in 
predicting driving outcomes from commonly used predictors, individual mental models, 
and importance ratings indices are shown in the order they were entered in the model. Of 
note is that none of the models were significant in predicting at-fault crashes. However, 
all models were significant in predicting the number of moving violations. 
The first block—commonly used predictors—accounted for 8% of the variance 
(p > .05) in predicting at–fault crashes. When entered following these predictors, mental 
models accounted for only a small amount of incremental variance (R2 = .01, p > .05). 
Importance ratings were able to explain a significant amount of incremental variance 
when entered after the commonly used predictors (R2 = .02, p < .05).  
Next, the same hierarchical regression analysis was performed with number of 
moving violations. The commonly used predictors entered in the first block were able to 
explain 10% of the variance in number of moving violations; the overall model was 
significant at p < .05. In the following step, importance ratings were unable to explain 
any unique variance in number of moving violations (R2 = .03, p > .05). However, 
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mental models explained significant incremental variance over the commonly used 
predictors (R2 = .05, p < .01). 
To assess whether mental model accuracy provides incremental predictive 
validity beyond importance rating accuracy, a third model was tested in which mental 
model accuracy was entered in the model after commonly used predictors and 
importance rating accuracy. This overall model was not predictive for at-fault crashes, 
and importance rating accuracy and mental model accuracy each provided minimal 
predictive validity beyond commonly used predictors. However, the amount of 
additional variance accounted for (R2) was significant for importance rating accuracy 
but not for mental model accuracy. 
In the prediction of moving violations, mental model accuracy continued to out-
predict importance rating accuracy even when entered in the same model following 
importance rating accuracy. Specifically, mental model accuracy accounted for an 
additional 4% of the variance in moving violations beyond the proportion of variance 
accounted for by commonly used predictors and importance rating accuracy. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-order Correlations Among All Study Variables 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Age 18.65 0.78 −        
2. Sex 0.48 0.50 .21* −       
3. Years driving 2.99 1.13 .45** .23* −      
4. Cognitive ability 8.10 2.32 .13 .13 .09 −     
5. Driving knowledge 12.56 2.00 –.11 –.03 .11 .15  −    
6. Mental model accuracy 0.12 0.08 .09 –.06 .03 .17 .20* −   
7. Importance rating accuracy 36.57 5.57 .02 –.05 .21* .18* .09 .13 −  
8. At-fault crashes 0.37 0.68 –.04 –.16 .12 .07 .00 –.11 –.11 − 
9. Moving violations 0.67 1.71 .02 .04 .30** .05 .00 –.15 –.03 .33** 
Note. N = 118. Sex: 0 = female, 1 = male. Higher mental model scores and higher importance rating scores indicate greater 
accuracy. Crash and moving violation information based on incidents from 2005 to 2009. *p < .05. ** p < .01. All tests are 
two-tailed. 
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Table 5 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Accuracy Indices on Driving Performance 
  At-fault Crashes Moving Violations 
Model Predictor R2 R2 R2 R2 
1 Commonly used predictors .08  .10*  
 Importance rating accuracy .10 .02* .13*  .03 
      
2 Commonly used predictors .08  .10*  
 Mental model accuracy .09 .01 .15** .05** 
      
3 Commonly used predictors .08  .10*  
 Importance rating accuracy .10 .02* .13* .03 
 Mental model accuracy .11 .01 .17** .04* 
Note. N = 118. Each line indicates a new block in the hierarchical regression.  
Commonly used predictors are age, sex, cognitive ability, number of years driving,  
and driving knowledge test. *p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Importance ratings and mental models were comparatively evaluated in terms of 
their ability to predict driving outcomes—crashes and moving violations. The objective 
of the present study was to investigate the extent to which importance ratings displayed 
similar relationships with driving outcomes compared to mental models.  
 On the basis of the observed results, it would seem that importance ratings and 
mental models measured distinct constructs. The two measures are conceptualized as 
representing two different kinds of knowledge, which were demonstrated to perform 
differently in the prediction of driving crashes and moving violations.  It was found that 
importance ratings, but not mental models, provided significant incremental validity in 
predicting at–fault crashes; the increased predictive validity was small for both 
measures. Mental models and importance ratings displayed incremental validity over 
commonly used predictors.  The results demonstrate that importance ratings may be a 
viable alternative to traditional mental model assessments in predicting crash 
involvement.  
Differences were found between the variance explained by importance ratings 
and mental models when predicting number of moving violations. Mental models 
explained more variance in the number of moving violations than did importance ratings. 
Moving violations are viewed as more motivational and attitudinal in nature (Arthur & 
Day, 2009), which may explain this finding. It is possible that importance ratings do not 
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accurately capture attitudes and values towards driving in addition to driving 
performance.  
Implications, Limitations, and Future Research 
Although the results found in the present study are mixed, they contribute to the 
literature on alternative mental model assessments in providing some evidence of 
predictive validity for importance ratings on a complex task.  Additionally, the present 
study is consistent with meta-analytic findings that suggest structure is not a necessary 
component for knowledge assessments that are meant to predict performance (DeChurch 
& Mesmer-Magnus, 2010) 
It is important to note that the present study did not seek to validate importance 
ratings as an alternative type of mental model but rather as a knowledge measure with 
potentially equal predictive validity for driving performance. In this view, the findings 
help shed light on the extent to which importance ratings are a useful measure in this 
domain—predicting adverse driving events. 
There are also implications for the measurement of knowledge in other domains. 
Specifically, mental model measurement is associated with administrative constraints 
and limitations (Clariana & Wallace, 2009; Singh, 2007). Mental model researchers may 
be constrained in the number of concepts they can use (Goldsmith et al., 1991), as the 
number affects administration times and likely test–taker motivation as well (Singh, 
2007). As demonstrated in this study, importance ratings may offer a less onerous 
measure compared to mental models, and are not associated with similar administrative 
limitations and constraints.   
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 Although the results are favorable towards continued research on the validity of 
importance ratings as alternative to mental models, there are limitations and 
recommendations to improve the methodology and guide future studies. First, some 
difficulty was encountered when computing the referent structures and ratings from the 
SMEs. A suggested solution is to involve different SMEs in developing the concepts 
recognizing that a second and separate group of SMEs would then be needed to actually 
provide the referent scores. Second, although detailed instructions on the measurements 
were provided, it was assumed participants and experts held similar meanings of "safe 
driving." The context-dependent definition is of particular importance in measuring 
knowledge structures as it provides raters with the target situation they should think of 
when rating the concepts.  Mental models within specific contexts are referred to as 
situation models. It is possible that different drivers envision varying situation models 
when asked about safe driving. Regarding this effect, future importance ratings 
measurements should also evaluate perceptions of overall task importance, which may 
add an evaluation of the participant’s motivations for performing the task in addition to 
cognitions of performing the task.  
An important next step in this line of research is to gather data on the actual 
administration times of Pathfinder and alternative measures. In the present study's 
protocol, participants were allotted roughly 10 minutes to complete the Pathfinder 
assessment and 2 minutes to complete the importance ratings; however, no restrictions 
on time were imposed (i.e., participants could have taken longer), and actual completion 
times were not measured. Additionally, the effect of participant reactions to the 
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measures could be collected in future studies to investigate whether meaningful 
differences are found between the measures similar to those reported by Singh (2007). 
Additionally, importance ratings and the pair-wise assessment method should be 
compared based on differing numbers of concepts. As Goldsmith et al. (1991) 
demonstrated, increasing the number of concepts should only serve to improve 
predictive validity. However, it is unknown at this time whether an importance rating 
measure with a greater number of concepts would result in higher predictive validity 
than a pair-wise mental model measure with fewer concepts. Based on the results of this 
study, it seems quite possible. 
The potential effect of not counter-balancing the importance rating and mental 
model measures is a significant limitation of the present study. This may have had an 
impact on participants’ ratings of task concept importance as these ratings always 
followed the completion of Pathfinder. Because Pathfinder is associated with a greater 
number of ratings and potentially increased negative reactions, the accuracy of 
participant importance ratings may have been affected due to decreased focus or 
increased fatigue.  
Another important limitation in the present study is the use of a sample of 
undergraduate drivers. This sample may have had reduced variability in driving 
performance because the participants have been driving for an average of 2.99 years. 
Additionally, the low frequency of at-fault crashes in this sample makes it more difficult 
to obtain statistical significance for known predictors of such outcomes (Arthur et al., 
1991; Elander, West, & French, 1993; Hansen, 1989). Stronger conclusions may be 
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found in a more diverse sample. Future research should compare importance ratings and 
mental models in other complex task domains to investigate the generalizability of these 
findings. 
Novel approaches to measuring knowledge structures provide valuable insights 
to the relationship between mental models and performance. Importance ratings as 
measured in the present study are not only more convenient to measure for researchers 
and complete for participants but also work as well as mental models in predicting at-
fault crash involvement.  The present study represents one attempt to assess and validate 
an alternative approach to assessing knowledge organization in a more convenient 
fashion. 
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APPENDIX A 
DRIVING BEHAVIOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Research ID: ______________________________________________ 
 
1. Do you have any problems seeing (even after correction)? 
 
 A. Yes 
 B. No 
 
2. Which of the following Driver’s Licenses do you have? (circle all that apply) 
 
 A. Class A (Vehicle over 26,000 pounds – can to anything above 10,000 pounds) 
 B. Class B (Vehicle over 26,000 pounds – cannot tow anything above 10,000 
    pounds) 
 C. Class C (Any passenger vehicle) 
 D. Class M (motorcycles, mopeds, etc) 
 
3. How long have you been driving (Round off to the nearest year) _____________ 
 (years) 
 
4. What types of vehicle(s) do you typically drive? (Check all the apply) 
 
 A. Passenger car  B. Pick–up truck 
 C. Sport–utility vehicle  D. Motorcycle 
 E. Van    F. Commercial vehicle (e.g., 18–wheeler, bus) 
 
5. Do you own a car phone or a cellular phone? 
 
 A. Yes 
 B. No 
 
6. On average, how many miles do you drive a week?  __________ (miles) 
 
7. On average, how many highway and/or interstate miles do you drive a week? 
 
 ______ (miles) 
 
8. On average, how many miles per hour under or over the speed limit do you drive? 
 
 _______ miles per hour  (For example, if you typically drive 3 miles under, put -3.  If 
 you typically drive at the speed limit, put 0.  If you typically drive 6 miles over, put +6) 
 
9. How many times have you taken a defensive driving class?  ____________ 
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10. How often do you use a safety belt when you are the driver of a vehicle? 
 
 A. Never 
 B. Rarely 
 C. Sometimes 
 D. Frequently 
 E. Always 
 
11. How often do you use a safety belt when you are a passenger of a vehicle? 
 
 A. Never 
 B. Rarely 
 C. Sometimes 
 D. Frequently 
 E. Always 
 
12. Which of the following best describes where you live? 
 
 A. Rural 
 B. Suburban 
 C. Urban 
 
13. Which of the following best describes where you do most of your driving? 
 
 A. Rural 
 B. Suburban 
 C. Urban 
 
14. How many driving/traffic accidents have you been involved in as one of the drivers in 
 which a person was killed? 
 
 ____________ 
 
 In how many of these were you at fault? 
 
 ____________ 
 
15. Excluding the accidents reported in QUESTION 14, how many driving/traffic accidents 
 have you been involved in as one of the drivers in which a person suffered physical 
 injury?  
 ____________ 
 
 In how many of these were you at fault? 
 
 ____________ 
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16. Excluding the accidents reported in QUESTIONS 14 and 15, how many driving/traffic 
 accidents have you been involved in as one of the drivers in which there was damage to 
 property? 
 
 ____________ 
 In how many of these were you at fault? 
 
 ____________ 
 
17. Of the accidents reported in QUESTION 16, how many resulted in property damage that 
 was greater than or equal to $750 in value? 
 
 ____________ 
 
 In how many of these were you at fault? 
 
18. Please list the number of accidents and moving violation tickets in each of the years 
 listed. 
 
 Year  At–Fault  Not At–Fault  Tickets 
   Accidents  Accidents  (Moving Violations) 
 
 2009  ____________  ____________  ____________ 
 2008  ____________  ____________  ____________ 
 2007  ____________  ____________  ____________ 
 2006  ____________  ____________  ____________ 
 2005  ____________  ____________  ____________ 
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APPENDIX B 
IMPORTANCE RATINGS 
 
Please rate each of the following concepts on its level of importance to driving using 
the scale below. Think of the terms as they relate to driving safely. 
 
Name: ______________________________________________ Date: _________ 
 
 
Not Important 
 
 
 
 
Somewhat  
Important 
 
 
 
Moderately 
Important 
 
 
 
Very 
Important 
 
 
 
 
Extremely 
Important 
 
 
 
1. Braking      
2. Changing lanes      
3. Fog      
4. Headlights      
5. Highway      
6. Judging distance      
7. Maintaining situational awareness (being aware of your 
surroundings)      
8. Passing      
9. Rain      
10. Right of way      
11. Speed      
12. Turn signal      
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APPENDIX C 
PATHFINDER 
 
In this task, you will see several concepts listed on the left hand side of the screen.  Each 
of these concepts will be presented as a focal concept in the bull’s-eye of the target on 
the right hand side.  The example below is like what you will see.  Here "dog" is in the 
bull's-eye. 
 
 
 
Your task is to move the concepts that are synonymous, extremely, largely, or 
moderately related to the target inside the appropriate gradient of the target.  Concepts 
that are less related or unrelated should be left in place at the left side.   
 
To move the concepts, click and drag them to the location in which you wish to drop 
them.  Each concept that you rate must fit into one of the five related categories 
(synonymous, extremely related, largely related, moderately related, or less 
related/unrelated), there is no in–between option.  Each concept will earn a score based 
on where the center of the concept box is located.  You can change your mind about a 
concept by moving it again.  When you finish with one target, click NEXT to proceed to 
the next target. 
 
A complete list of concepts will be presented prior to beginning the task.  This will give 
you a general idea of the scope of the concepts you will be rating. 
 
Here are the concepts. Now, when you are doing this, do not think too much or too long. 
Just go with what initially comes to mind. 
 
 Braking 
 Changing lanes 
43 
 
 
 Fog 
 Headlights 
 Highway 
 Judging distance 
 Maintaining situational awareness (being aware of your surroundings) 
 Passing 
 Rain 
 Right of way 
 Speed 
 Turn signal 
 
The example below shows one person's responses for the target "dog". The concept 
"mammal" is in the extremely related gradient whereas the concept "color" is in the 
moderately related gradient, and so on.  
 
 
 
Your task on the computer is to make judgments about the ―relatedness‖ of pairs of 
concepts that have to do with driving.  There are several ways one might think about the 
concepts being judged.  For instance, two concepts might be related because they share 
common features or because they frequently occur together.  For this task, think about 
the concepts as they relate to driving safely. 
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